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INTRODUCTION
The Internet increasingly offers a preferred medium for access
to video and other types of high value content1 that may require
Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) to use special efforts to ensure

*

Pioneers Chair and Professor of Telecommunications and Law, Penn State
University; 102 Carnegie Building, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802; (814) 863-7996;
rmf5@psu.edu; web site: http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/r/m/rmf5
1
Viewing of [Online Video Distributors] video programming on
multiple devices is becoming increasingly prevalent. SNL Kagan
estimates that as of 2013, more than 53 million U.S. households
watched online programming with at least one Internet-connected
device, including computers, game consoles, streaming media
players, television sets, and Blu-ray players, with an average of 4.8
such devices per online viewing household.
In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of
Video Programming, Sixteenth Report, 30 FCC Rcd. 3253, para. 10 (2015).
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superior quality of service (“QOS”).2 ISPs have made substantial
investments in infrastructure upgrades to satisfy growing demand
for networks capable of delivering bandwidth intensive traffic at
higher transmission speeds. Additionally, they work to accommodate consumer expectations of having content access anytime, anywhere, through any medium, via any device, and in any screen
presentation format. Early adopters of new video delivery technologies rely on both wireline and wireless alternatives to “legacy”
media such as broadcast, cable, and satellite television. Consumers
have declining tolerance for “appointment television”3 that limits
access to a specific time, on a particular channel, and in a single
presentation format.
Already some video content consumers have “cut the cord”
and abandoned traditional video media options replacing them with
online platforms offering access to live content as well as streaming
of stored content. The terms Internet Protocol Television
(“IPTV”)4 and Over-the-Top Television (“OTT”)5 refer to the
ability of content creators and new or existing content distributors
2

“OVDs account for an increasing portion of Internet traffic during peak hours. For
instance, Sandvine states that Netflix accounted for 34.2 percent of peak period
downstream traffic in March 2014, compared with 31.6 percent during the second half of
2013.” Id. para. 11.
3
“A secular trend toward narrowcasting has intensified on the web, as more
individuals forsake appointment television for the ‘long tail’ of online content.” Frank
Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in
Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 110 (2010).
4
IPTV offers consumers with broadband connections options to download video files
or view (streaming) video content on an immediate “real time” basis. See In re Sky Angel
U.S., LLC, Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 3879 (2010). Some of the available content duplicates
what cable television subscribers receive therein triggering disputes over whether cable
operators can secure exclusive distribution agreements and prevent an IPTV service
provider from distributing the same content. “Sky Angel has been providing its
subscribers with certain Discovery networks for approximately two and a half years,
including the Discovery Channel, Animal Planet, Discovery Kids Channel, Planet Green,
and the Military Channel. Sky Angel submits that these channels are a significant part of
its service offering.” Id. para. 3. For background on IPTV, see In-Sung Yoo, The
Regulatory Classification of Internet Protocol Television: How the Federal Communications
Commission Should Abstain From Cable Service Regulation and Promote Broadband
Deployment, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 199 (2009).
5
“Over-the-top VoIP [and other] services require the end user to obtain broadband
transmission from a third-party provider, and providers of over-the-top [services] can
vary in terms of the extent to which they rely on their own facilities.” In re Preserving the
Open Internet, Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, para. 22 n.48 (2010).
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to provide consumers with access to video content via broadband
links, in lieu of, or in addition to, traditional media. New distribution media have the ability to deliver “mission critical” bits requiring highly reliable conduits for the immediate (“real time”) transmission of video content and their instantaneous display. IPTV and
OTT can offer consumers new options for accessing “must see”
video content,6 such as live sporting events.
This Article assesses whether and how ISPs can offer QOS enhancements, at premium prices for full motion video, while still
complying with the new open Internet rules and regulations established by the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”
or the “Commission”) in March, 2015.7 This Article explains that
having made the controversial decision to reclassify all forms of
Internet access as a telecommunications service, the FCC increases
regulatory uncertainty. In particular, the FCC has evidenced skepticism whether ISPs, providing retail first- and last-mile broadband
service to residential subscribers,8 can offer QOS enhancements
that serve real consumer wants, without harming competition and
the ability of most content to arrive on a timely basis using conven-

6

Video has greater potential to cause disruptions in service in light of the substantial
amount of content that ISPs must handle quickly so that frames of content arrive in time
for immediate display. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Technologies of Storytelling: New Models for
Movies, 10 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 106, 132 (2010).
7
In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on Remand,
Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 Open Internet
Order]; see also In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Order Denying Stay
Petitions, 30 FCC Rcd. 4681 (2015) [hereinafter Order Denying Stay] (order denying
requested stay of the 2015 Open Internet Order).
8
The FCC’s definition of broadband Internet access emphasizes the offering of
service that reaches nearly all sources of content as opposed to services that offer
enhanced delivery for specific sources of content.
[B]roadband Internet access service (BIAS) [is defined] as: [a] massmarket retail service by wire or radio that provides the capability to
transmit data to and receive data from all or substantially all Internet
endpoints, including any capabilities that are incidental to and enable
the operation of the communications service, but excluding dial-up
Internet access service. This term also encompasses any service that
the Commission finds to be providing a functional equivalent of the
service described in the previous sentence, or that is used to evade
the protections set forth in this Part.
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, para. 187.
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tional “best efforts” routing.9 This Article suggests that the FCC
expand its “narrow” waiver criteria10 to allow retail ISPs to join
their upstream counterparts,11 and provide video delivery enhancements that do not degrade conventional best efforts routing,
or prioritize traffic in ways designed to disadvantage competitors.
I. THE FCC’S 2015 OPEN INTERNET ORDER
In a controversial decision (the “2015 Open Internet Order”),12 the FCC opted to reclassify elements of Internet access as

9

The Internet developed initially as an academic curiosity, based on a
commitment to the “end-to-end principle.” This principle requires
that all Internet traffic, whether an email, a Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) “call” or a video stream, be treated equally and
managed through “best efforts” connections. In such a network, data
packets pass from one router to another without the prioritization of
any particular packets. In practice, this means that Internet traffic
reaches its destination at varying times, depending on the traffic
levels of the relevant Internet communications links.
Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 273, 280
(2008).
10
“Under the rule we adopt today, the Commission will ban all paid prioritization
subject to a narrow waiver process.” 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, para. 107.
“We anticipate granting such relief only in exceptional cases.” Id. para. 132.
11
The 2015 Open Internet Order maintains the largely unregulated information service
classification for ISPs operating upstream from operators that provide “retail” broadband
subscriptions.
[Title II, common carrier regulated] broadband Internet access
service does not include virtual private network (VPN) services,
content delivery networks (CDNs), hosting or data storage services,
or Internet backbone services (to the extent those services are
separate from broadband Internet access service). The Commission
has historically distinguished these services from “mass market”
services and, as explained in the 2014 Open Internet NPRM, they
“do not provide the capability to receive data from all or substantially
all Internet endpoints.” We do not disturb that finding here.
Id. para. 190 (citations omitted).
12
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7; see also Joint Brief for Petitioners United
States Telecom Ass’n et al., United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, No. 15-1063 (D.C.
Cir. July 30, 2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-334673A1.pdf
[http://perma.cc/WV2G-JCX2] [hereinafter USTelecom Joint Brief]; Motion for Stay or
Expedition of USTelecom et al., United States Telecom Ass’n, No. 15-1063 (D.C. Cir. May
13,
2015),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-333494A1.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5YXF-FFX4].
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a Title II regulated, common carrier service13 with no distinction
between wireline and wireless ISPs.14 The Commission will have to
convince an appellate court the reclassification resulted from rational decision making based on a complete record evidencing substantially changed circumstances occurring in the ten years since
2005, when the FCC opted to classify Internet access as an information service.15
The FCC emphasized the need for narrowly crafted rules designed to “prevent specific practices we know are harmful to Internet openness—blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization—as
well as a strong standard of conduct designed to prevent the dep13

See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, para. 25.
The FCC previously had imposed less stringent rules on wireless carriers in light of
spectrum use, greater potential for congestion, and recent entry in broadband markets.
The 2015 Open Internet Order treats wireless ISPs no differently than wireline ISPs:
Today, we find that changes in the mobile broadband marketplace
warrant a revised approach. We find that the mobile broadband
marketplace has evolved, and continues to evolve, but is no longer in
a nascent stage. As discussed below, mobile broadband networks are
faster, more broadly deployed, more widely used, and more
technologically advanced than they were in 2010. We conclude that it
would benefit the millions of consumers who access the Internet on
mobile devices to apply the same set of Internet openness protections
to both fixed and mobile networks.
Id. para. 88.
15
“It is also well settled that we may reconsider, on reasonable grounds, the
Commission’s earlier application of the ambiguous statutory definitions of
‘telecommunications service’ and ‘information service.’” Id. para. 334.
The [Supreme] Court’s application of [the] Chevron test in Brand X
makes clear our delegated authority to revisit our prior interpretation
of ambiguous statutory terms and reclassify broadband Internet
access service as a telecommunications service. The Court upheld the
Commission’s prior information services classification because “the
statute fails unambiguously to classify the telecommunications
component of cable modem service as a distinct offering. This leaves
federal telecommunications policy in this technical and complex area
to be set by the Commission.” Where a term in the Act “admit[s] of
two or more reasonable ordinary usages, the Commission’s choice of
one of them is entitled to deference.” The Court concluded, given
the “technical, complex, and dynamic” questions that the
Commission resolved in the Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, “[t]he
Commission is in a far better position to address these questions than
we are.”
Id. para. 332 (citations omitted).
14
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loyment of new [anticompetitive] practices that would harm Internet openness.”16 The Commission emphasized that ISPs have both
the incentive and ability to leverage access in ways that can thwart
innovation and investment in the Internet ecosystem:
The key insight of the virtuous cycle is that broadband providers have both the incentive and the ability to act as gatekeepers standing between edge providers and consumers. As gatekeepers, they can
block access altogether; they can target competitors,
including competitors to their own video services;
and they can extract unfair tolls.17
The FCC also emphasized that while subjecting ISPs to Title
II, common carrier oversight, the Commission will use its statutory
authority quite narrowly as evidenced by the decision to forbear18
from applying “27 provisions of Title II of the Communications
Act, and over 700 Commission rules and regulations.”19 The
Commission recognized the need to explain how the new require16

Id. para. 4.
Id. para. 20.
18
47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2013) authorizes the FCC to streamline the scope of its Title II
oversight by forbearing from applying many common carrier requirements:
[T]he Commission shall forbear from applying any regulation or any
provision of this chapter to a telecommunications carrier or
telecommunications service, or class of telecommunications carriers
or telecommunications services, in any or some of its or their
geographic markets, if the Commission determines that—(1)
enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to ensure
that the charges, practices, classifications, or regulations by, for, or in
connection
with
that
telecommunications
carrier
or
telecommunications service are just and reasonable and are not
unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory; (2) enforcement of such
regulation or provision is not necessary for the protection of
consumers; and (3) forbearance from applying such provision or
regulation is consistent with the public interest.
19
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, para. 5. The major provisions of Title II that
the 2015 Open Internet Order will apply are: nondiscrimination and no unjust and
unreasonable practices under sections 201 and 202; authority to investigate complaints
and resolve disputes under section 208 and related enforcement provisions, specifically
sections 206, 207, 209, 216, and 217; protection of consumer privacy under section 222;
fair access to poles and conduits under section 224; protection of people with disabilities
under sections 225 and 255; and providing universal funding for broadband service, but
not the requirement to collect contributions to such funding through partial application of
section 254.
17
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ments satisfy pressing needs, but in the most narrow and well calibrated matter in light of virulent opposition from most ISPs and
two Republican Commissioners.20 The 2015 Open Internet Order
reports that:
[T]here will be fewer sections of Title II applied
than have been applied to Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) [the regulatory classification
for wireless voice telecommunications service],
where Congress expressly required the application
of [s]ections 201, 202, and 208, and permitted the
Commission to forbear from others. In fact, Title II
has never been applied in such a focused way.21
In addition to the specific prohibitions on blocking, throttling,
and paid prioritization, the FCC established a general prohibition
on ISP practices that would unreasonably interfere with or disadvantage downstream consumers and upstream edge providers of
content, applications, and services.22 The Commission will consider on a case-by-case basis whether an ISP has engaged in a practice
“that unreasonably interfere[s] with or unreasonably disadvantage[s] the ability of consumers to reach the Internet content, services, and applications of their choosing or of edge providers to
access consumers using the Internet.”23
The Commission opted to apply more open-ended evaluative
criteria than the legal standard requiring proof of commercial reasonableness it had previously proposed.24 The Commission concluded that it should “adopt a governing standard that looks to
whether consumers or edge providers face unreasonable interference or unreasonable disadvantages, and makes clear that the
standard is not limited to whether a practice is agreeable to commercial parties.”25
20

Id. paras. 4–5, 192.
Id. para. 38.
22
See id. para. 108.
23
Id. para. 135.
24
See In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 29 FCC Rcd. 5561, para. 136 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 Open Internet
NPRM].
25
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, para. 150. The FCC identified a number of
factors it will consider in future evaluations. These factors include an assessment of
21
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The FCC also opted to use a “no-unreasonable interference/disadvantage” standard to evaluate controversial subjects
including the lawfulness of “sponsored data” arrangements where
an ISP accepts advertiser payment in exchange for an agreement
not to meter and debit its broadband subscribers for the downstream traffic delivery.26 The Commission also will use this standard to consider the lawfulness of data caps that tier service by bit
transmission speed and the amount of permissible downloading
volume.27 In both instances, the FCC sees the potential for an ISP
to create artificial scarcity to extract higher revenues and to favor
corporate affiliates and third parties willing to pay a surcharge.28
Additionally, the FCC views data caps as possibly handicapping
OTT/IPTV vendors of video programming that compete with an
ISP service, but use the ISP network to deliver content to consumers.29 Conversely, the Commission recognizes that some types of
service tiering can promote innovation and new, customized services.30
The 2015 Open Internet Order expresses the view that reclassifying Internet access as a telecommunications service provides the
strongest legal foundation for network neutrality regulations,
coupled with a secondary reference to section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 199631 and Title III of the Communications
Act of 1934, as amended,32 which addresses the use of radio spectrum and applies common carriage regulation to wireless voice car-

whether a practice allows end-user control and is consistent with promoting consumer
choice, the competitive effects of a practice, whether consumers and opportunities for
free expression are promoted or harmed, the effect on innovation, investment, or
broadband deployment, whether the practice hinders the ability of end users or edge
providers to use broadband access to communicate with each other, and whether a
practice conforms to the best practices and technical standards adopted by an open,
broadly representative, and independent Internet engineering, governance initiatives, or
standards-setting organization. See id. paras. 139–45.
26
See id. para. 152.
27
See id. para. 153.
28
See id. paras. 151–53.
29
See id. para. 153.
30
See id. para. 151.
31
47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2013).
32
Id. §§ 301–399b.

2015]

NETWORK NEUTRALITY AND CONSUMER DEMAND

79

riers.33 By using the stronger Title II foundation, the FCC asserts
that it can establish clear and unconditional statutory authority, but
also use the flexibility contained in Title II to forbear from applying
unnecessary common carrier requirements just as the Commission
had done for wireless telephone service. However, with a Title II
regulatory foundation, the 2015 Open Internet Order makes it
possible for the FCC to create an open Internet conduct standard
that ISPs cannot harm consumers or content providers, coupled
with enforcement tools available to sanction violations.34 The
Commission’s decision to treat aspects of Internet access as common carriage has triggered a third judicial appeal and review of
whether such reclassification constitutes a reasonable decision
based on a complete evidentiary record.35 By opting for the reclas-

33

We ground the open Internet rules we adopt today in multiple
sources of legal authority—section 706, Title II, and Title III of the
Communications Act. We marshal all of these sources of authority
toward a common statutorily-supported goal: to protect and promote
Internet openness as platform for competition, free expression and
innovation; a driver of economic growth; and an engine of the
virtuous cycle of broadband deployment.
We therefore invoke multiple, complementary sources of legal
authority. As a number of parties point out, our authority under
section 706 is not mutually exclusive with our authority under Titles
II and III of the Act.
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, paras. 273–74.
34
With an eye toward providing timely, certain, and flexible enforcement of its open
Internet rules, the FCC announced its intention to use advisory opinions similar to those
issued by the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division.
Advisory opinions will enable companies to seek guidance on the
propriety of certain open Internet practices before implementing
them, enabling them to be proactive about compliance and avoid
enforcement actions later. The Commission may use advisory
opinions to explain how it will evaluate certain types of behavior and
the factors that will be considered in determining whether open
Internet violations have occurred. Because these opinions will be
publicly available, we believe that they will reduce the number of
disputes by providing guidance to the industry.
Id. para. 229.
35
See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7; Order Denying Stay, supra note 7; see
also USTelecom Joint Brief, supra note 12.
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sification option, the FCC underscores the riskiness in imposing ex
ante regulation36 without an explicit legislative mandate.
A. Can ISPs Offer QOS Enhancement for IPTV?
As the Internet has commercialized and diversified, interconnection terms and conditions have changed between ISPs as they
pursue alternatives to conventional models for securing the global
carriage of traffic.37 Because no single ISP owns or leases all the
network facilities needed to link any source of content with any
customer of the ISP, traffic interconnection and compensation arrangement provide necessary supplemental capacity. ISPs traditionally classified interconnection as either peering38 or transiting.39
The former involves interconnection between high capacity carriers whose transoceanic and transcontinental traffic volumes generally match, thereby enabling the carriers to barter network access in
lieu of a financial settlement. Historically, smaller carriers have
paid transit fees to larger ISPs for the opportunity to secure upstream links throughout the Internet cloud.40
In light of growing demand for bandwidth intensive video content delivered via the Internet, traffic volume disparities have increased between ISPs. Because most consumers download more
36

Ex ante rules and regulations anticipate the need for government-imposed
safeguards to prevent anticompetitive practices in a specific sector of the economy,
because of existing or potential harm to consumers and the national economy.
37
See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Innovations in the Internet’s Architecture that Challenge
the Status Quo, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 79, 84 (2010) (outlining new ISP
interconnection variations of peering and transiting).
38
“Peering” refers to a barter arrangement for traffic exchange where two Internet
Service Providers agree to accept traffic from the other without the transfer of funds. The
carriers agree to a settlement-free arrangement, because traffic volumes generally match.
39
“Transiting” refers to an exchange of traffic that triggers a financial settlement and
transfer of funds. This arrangement typically results when a small carrier needs the
services of a larger carrier to reach all Internet carriers and end users.
40
The “Internet cloud” refers to the vast array of interconnected networks that make
up the Internet and provide users with seamless connectivity to these networks and the
content available via these networks. “The increasing functionality of the Internet is
decreasing the role of the personal computer. This shift is being led by the growth of
‘cloud computing’—the ability to run applications and store data on a service provider’s
computers over the Internet, rather than on a person’s desktop computer.” William
Jeremy Robison, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under The Stored
Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1199 (2010).
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traffic than they upload, expanding demand for downstream delivery of video content broadens the differential. A new category of
carrier, commonly referred to as a Content Delivery Network
(“CDN”),41 targets the downstream video content delivery market, all but guaranteeing an asymmetrical traffic flow necessitating
a financial settlement with retail ISPs instead of a simple barter
agreement. CDNs incur transit charges, or have to negotiate other
compensation arrangements with retail ISPs, because the downstream traffic requires flows to broadband subscribers from CDNs
that far exceed the volume of traffic retail ISPs have available to
hand off for upstream carriage.
Such asymmetry in traffic flows can generate interconnection
compensation disputes such as that which occurred for Netflix content between a major CDN, Level 3, and a major ISP, Comcast,
which provides “last mile” delivery of Internet content to broadband subscribers.42 Content distributors, such as Netflix, also have
pursued an alternative to using CDNs by securing a paid peering
arrangement directly with Comcast,43 and by installing servers containing the most popular content, closer to subscribers on the premises of a retail ISP.44

41

A CDN is an organized network of computers that are often placed
“close” to Internet users. Commonly accessed content is then stored
on those computers and requests by web users are directed to
“nearby” or lightly loaded computers. Content distribution networks
can be used to save bandwidth since the content for a popular item
does not need to be fetched from a distant location.
Dirk Grunwald, The Internet Ecosystem: The Potential for Discrimination, 63 FED. COMM.
L.J. 411, 426 (2011).
42
See, e.g., Daniel L. Brenner & Winston Maxwell, The Network Neutrality and the
Netflix Dispute: Upcoming Challenges for Content Providers in Europe and the United States,
23 No. 3 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3 (2011).
43
See Shalini Ramachandran, Netflix to Pay Comcast for Smoother Streaming, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 23, 2014, 7:47 PM) http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304
834704579401071892041790 [http://perma.cc/58FU-T2BH].
44
Content providers and distributors can opt to negotiate directly with retail ISPs for
the right to install (“co-locate”) equipment on site, or alternatively secure the services of
a company, such as Akamai, to negotiate, install, and maintain the equipment. Netflix has
sought the direct negotiation option with ISPs. See Ken Florence, Announcing the Netflix
Open Connect Network, NETFLIX: U.S. & CAN. BLOG (June 4, 2012), http://blog.
netflix.com/2012/06/announcing-netflix-open-connect-network.html [http://perma.cc/
4SXH-8SYS].
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CDNs typically become transit payers even if previously they
qualified for zero cost peering, but questions remain whether retail
ISPs, such as Comcast, have an affirmative duty to try offsetting
traffic imbalances. Likewise, consumers wonder what service
commitments they deserve to receive from their retail ISPs that
accrue sizeable monthly Internet access subscription revenues. The
carriers respond that they have had to increase available network
capacity and thereby enhance the value proposition of service despite not receiving additional compensation from the ventures who
cause massive increases in download volume, i.e., ventures such as
Netflix and YouTube.45
On occasion, retail broadband subscribers have experienced
degraded service, particularly for bandwidth intensive applications
such as full motion video streaming.46 Identifying the actual cause
of such congestion remains elusive. Content creators and distributors speculate whether retail ISPs have deliberately caused congestion, by refusing to make timely network capacity upgrades, or by
allocating available capacity in ways that increase the probability of
congestion for the traffic of specific content types and sources.47
ISPs reject this scenario and cite to less nefarious circumstances
such as weather, home-based holidays, and the decision of content
distributors, such as Netflix, to release an entire season’s worth of
45

For example, Comcast has provided subscribers with increased bit transmission
speeds, initially without a rate increase. See Comcast Increases Internet Speeds for 13th Time
in 12 Years, COMCAST (April 9, 2014), http://corporate.comcast.com/news-information/
news-feed/comcast-xfinity-internet-speed-increase [http://perma.cc/X22B-QMWM].
46
See Drew Fitzgerald & Shalini Ramachandran, Netflix-Traffic Feud Leads to Video
Slowdown, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2014, 9:35 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304899704579391223249896550 [http://perma.cc/6SVS-N5M2].
47
Five major internet service providers in the U.S. and one in Europe
have been accused of abusing their market share to interfere with the
flow of the internet for end users. The accusations come from Level
3, a communications company that helps connect large-scale ISPs like
Comcast or AT&T to the rest of the internet. According to the
company, these six unnamed ISPs are deliberately degrading the
quality of internet services using the Level 3 network, in an attempt to
get Level 3 to pay them a fee for additional traffic caused by services
like Netflix, a process known as paid peering.
Andrew Webster, Major ISPs Accused of Deliberately Throttling Traffic, VERGE (May 6,
2014, 10:06 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/5/6/5686780/major-isps-accused-ofdeliberately-throttling-traffic [http://perma.cc/3M7H-8FBL].
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a program instead of the conventional weekly release of just one
episode.48 Consumers and regulators alike have no easy means for
identifying the cause because multiple carriers participate in the
complete routing of traffic from source to end user.49 Sophisticated
network tracking techniques are needed to identify the weakest
link—the network operating with the lowest available bandwidth
and switching capacity, which can cause end users to experience
delays in downloads and even dropped packets of content.50 Parties
will disagree on the cause of congestion as well as the required remedy.51
B. Regulatory Uncertainty
The 2015 Open Internet Order provides a quite complex and
uncertain assessment of IPTV traffic routing depending on what
kind of venture handles the traffic, as well as its location in the sequence of network facilities linking content source and consumer.
The FCC continues to treat the caching52 of video content by proxy
48
“The hit political drama series of Netflix kept about 60,000 subscribers glued onto
their screens on Valentine’s Day to watch the whole 13-hour production. However, the
shifting behavior of consumers to watch videos on demand over the Internet is causing
some clogged pipes on the information highway.” Randell Suba, Netflix-Verizon Standoff:
Only Net Neutrality Can Now Stop Video Slowdown, TECH TIMES (Feb. 23, 2014, 7:27
AM), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/3670/20140223/netflix-verizon-standoff-onlynet-neutrality-can-now-stop-video-slowdown.htm [http://perma.cc/XJH9-YAR9].
49
See id.
50
See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, para. 85.
51
If you are trying to get Netflix and use Verizon’s broadband, then
there is a good chance that your video performance is less than
optimal. Some Verizon customers might even go as far as calling it a
crappy Netflix experience. The reason: a behind-the-scenes power
play between Verizon and Cogent Communications, one of the largest
bandwidth providers.
Om Malik & Stacey Higginbotham, Having Problems with Your Netflix? You Can Blame
Verizon, GIGAOM (June 17, 2013, 7:23 PM), https://gigaom.com/2013/06/17/havingproblems-with-your-netflix-you-can-blame-verizon/ [http://perma.cc/7KU3-6DQ8]; see
also Dan Rayburn, Here’s How the Comcast & Netflix Deal Is Structured, With Data &
Numbers, STREAMINGMEDIABLOG.COM (Feb. 27, 2014, 12:14 PM), http://blog.
streamingmedia.com/2014/02/heres-comcast-netflix-deal-structured-numbers.html
[http://perma.cc/QUZ3-HXSX].
52
“Caching is the storing of copies of content at locations in a network closer to
subscribers than the original source of the content. This enables more rapid retrieval of
information from websites that subscribers wish to see most often.” 2015 Open Internet
Order, supra note 7, para. 356 n.973.
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servers53 as an information service.54 CDNs can continue to distribute video content across a wide geographical area in ways that reduce delay (latency) and improve overall QOS by reducing the
number of networks and routers traversed.55 CDNs, such as Akamai Technologies, offer services that appear to enhance consumer
welfare without harming the marketplace of ideas or the competitive marketplace for Internet content carriage services.56
53

An Internet Service Provider, considered here as an entity that
operates a telecommunications network and provides access to the
Internet, may also install a proxy server to deal with the requests sent
by its users.
A proxy may serve many different purposes, for example,
filtering the traffic. However, the key purpose I want to consider now
is the one of saving bandwidth, and thus improving the efficiency of
the network. An ISP can save bandwidth by means of a proxy by
keeping a copy of the responses originated by previous requests, and
using those copies to serve subsequent requests made by the same
user or by a different one. This function is called “caching,” or more
precisely “proxy-caching.”
A proxy that implements a caching function is known as a
“caching proxy,” or a “proxy cache.” Caching proxies have been
widely used by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to store copies of
Web pages frequently requested by their users, so that they could
show the cached copy to users that subsequently request the same
Web page.
Miquel Peguera, When the Cached Link is the Weakest Link: Search Engine Caches Under the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 589, 603 (2009).
54
“We adopt our tentative conclusion in the 2014 Open Internet NPRM that
broadband Internet access service does not include virtual private network (VPN)
services, content delivery networks (CDNs), hosting or data storage services, or Internet
backbone services (to the extent those services are separate from broadband Internet
access service).” 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, para. 190. “The record in this
proceeding leads us to the conclusion that providers today market and offer consumers
separate services that are best characterized as (1) a broadband Internet access service
that is a telecommunications service; and (2) ‘add-on’ applications, content, and services
that are generally information services.” Id. para. 341.
55
See id. para. 190.
56
CDNs have become useful primarily because they provide a way to
provide scalable service. The canonical example for this is the success
that Victoria’s Secret (a retailer) had in hosting online content before
and after using a commercial CDN. In the initial offering, demand for
the retailer’s content exceeded the capabilities of its own web
services, but successive offerings using a CDN were much more
successful.
Grunwald, supra note 41, at 426; see also AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES, THE BUSINESS
INTERNET A PREDICTABLE PLATFORM FOR PROFITABLE E-BUSINESS (2004),
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Additionally, the FCC does not apply its prohibition of blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization on ISPs operating upstream
from last mile, retail ISPs.57 However, the Commission retains
Title II jurisdiction to investigate and resolve interconnection disputes between retail ISPs and both CDNs and upstream ISPs.58
The FCC faces a major regulatory quandary in identifying instances where it must intervene rather than allow arm’s length,
commercial negotiations between ventures partnering in the delivery of video content from content source to end user. On one
hand, the FCC noted the existence of several high visibility conflicts between content distributors, such as Netflix, and downstream ISPs, such as Comcast.59 The likelihood for disruption to
consumers caused by these disputes appears to have motivated the
FCC to deem both the downstream delivery to retail broadband
subscribers and most of the routing of traffic upstream from retail
ISPs as a telecommunications service.60

http://www.diku.dk/OLD/undervisning/2004e/358/Akamai_Business_Internet_White
paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/3PRD-VMK9].
57
See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, para. 190.
58
“[T]he Commission will be available to hear disputes regarding arrangements for the
exchange of traffic with a broadband Internet access provider raised under sections 201
and 202 on a case-by-case basis.” Id. para. 193.
59
See id. para. 199.
60
[W]e classify fixed and mobile broadband Internet access service as
telecommunications services. The definition for broadband Internet
access service includes the exchange of Internet traffic by an edge
provider or an intermediary with the broadband provider’s network.
We note that anticompetitive and discriminatory practices in this
portion of broadband Internet access service can have a deleterious
effect on the open Internet . . . .
Id. para. 195.
Broadband Internet access service involves the exchange of traffic
between a last-mile broadband provider and connecting
networks. . . . Thus, disputes involving a provider of broadband
Internet access service regarding Internet traffic exchange
arrangements that interfere with the delivery of a broadband Internet
access service end user’s traffic are subject to our authority under
Title II of the Act.
Id. para. 204.
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On the other hand, the FCC determined that it should not apply network neutrality rules to traffic upstream from retail ISPs,61
and also that it should limit the scope of Title II safeguards available for application to traffic exchanges between upstream CDNs
and retail ISPs.62 The potential for regulatory intervention presents
uncertainty for both the Commission and commercial ventures because no clear standard exists for understanding what constitutes
unreasonable and anticompetitive “better than best efforts”
routing and what does not. A retail ISP could create artificial congestion as leverage to nudge or push a content distributor to more
expensive, “premium” service, but this paid prioritization option
might simply constitute a necessary safeguard to ensure high quality IPTV service even during instances where real congestion occurs.
While expressing support for commercially driven interconnection and compensation arrangements, the Commission does not
provide sufficient guidance on when it would intervene to reverse
or condition arrangements that might provide desirable QOS enhancements, but also trigger other public interest concerns.63 The
Commission strongly implies a disinclination to grant paid prioritization waivers, but it appears almost exclusively concerned about
last mile arrangements.

61

“[W]e conclude that, at this time, application of the no-unreasonable
interference/disadvantage standard and the prohibitions on blocking, throttling, and paid
prioritization to the Internet traffic exchange arrangements is not warranted.” Id. para.
195.
62
The definition for broadband Internet access service includes the
exchange of Internet traffic by an edge provider or an intermediary
with the broadband provider’s network. We note that anticompetitive
and discriminatory practices in this portion of broadband Internet
access service can have a deleterious effect on the open Internet, and
therefore retain targeted authority to protect against such practices
through sections 201, 202, and 208 of the Act (and related
enforcement provisions), but will forbear from a majority of the other
provisions of the Act.
Id.
63
“Internet traffic exchange agreements have historically been and will continue to be
commercially negotiated. We do not believe that it is appropriate or necessary to subject
arrangements for Internet traffic exchange (which are subsumed within broadband
Internet access service) to the rules we adopt today.” Id. para. 202.
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For example, Netflix and Comcast have agreed to a “paid peering” solution to traffic congestion.64 This arrangement provides
higher quality service by reducing the use of other networks, thereby expediting delivery of traffic even when congestion would degrade traffic over lines subject to traditional, best efforts routing.65
Under a paid peering arrangement, traffic can arrive via the most
advantageous means, resulting in less latency, fewer circuitous
routing arrangements, and the use of fewer routers and other
switching equipment. Because the traffic prioritization offered by
Comcast to Netflix occurs at interconnection points far upstream
from last mile delivery, the FCC rules all but ignore the arrangement.
Companies such as Netflix have opted to pay for peering rather
than risk the consequences of degraded network delivery of “mission critical” bandwidth intensive video. The decision by Netflix to
secure paid peering access to the Comcast network triggered extensive commentary and analysis.66 Some believe Netflix capitu64
See Comcast and Netflix Team Up to Provide Customers Excellent User Experience,
NETFLIX (Feb. 23, 2014), https://pr.netflix.com/WebClient/getNewsSummary.do?news
Id=992 [http://perma.cc/X3QY-KQM5].
65
Paid peering, for example, resembles normal peering in almost every
respect, except that one network pays the other network even when
the exchange of traffic is roughly the same. These more sophisticated
agreements reflect the fact that while the traffic exchange may be
equal, the cost of maintaining the networks’ respective
infrastructures may be unequal. ISPs serving a smaller number of
large internet content websites (known as “content networks”) have
lower costs in maintaining their infrastructure than ISPs serving
home users (“eyeball networks”), since residential neighborhoods
require more equipment investment (such as wiring) and
maintenance than commercial areas. These interconnection
agreements create the economic incentives for ISPs to route internet
traffic along the lowest-cost paths, which can sometimes have a
discriminatory effect on certain types of content, applications, and
services.
Alexander Reicher, Redefining Net Neutrality After Comcast v. FCC, 26 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 733, 752 (2011).
66
For a collection of commentaries and critiques, see February 24, 2014 (Netflix Agrees
to Pay Comcast to End Traffic Jam), BENTON FOUND., https://www.benton.org/node/
175252 [http://perma.cc/9W64-432W] (last visited Oct. 6, 2015); February 25, 2014
(More on Netflix-Comcast and Comcast-TWC), BENTON FOUND., https://www.benton.org/
node/175351 [http://perma.cc/3QZG-YKX8] (last visited Oct. 6, 2015); February 26,
2014 (Comcast-Netflix; Unlocking Cellphones) BENTON FOUND., https://www.benton.org/
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lated to extortion by succumbing to thinly veiled threats by retail
ISPs like Comcast that, absent surcharge payments, Netflix video
file downloads would regularly trigger congestion and a degraded
customer experience.67 These observers believe Comcast caused
Netflix traffic to slow down as a way to extort a surcharge payment68 from high volume sources of content to help underwrite
needed network upgrades.69 Others consider paid peering a pragmatic and commercially wise decision by Netflix to secure enhanced QOS delivery guarantees and achieve greater certainty that

node/175425 [http://perma.cc/4RM8-3HNQ] (last visited Oct. 6, 2015); and February
27, 2014 (Net Neutrality; Comcast; Wireless), BENTON FOUND., https://www.benton.org/
node/175497 [http://perma.cc/B68Z-Y6F9] (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).
67
From what information is public, it appears that the largest ISPs are
demanding payment from networks that deliver content and services
that residential broadband consumers demand. Because the large
residential ISPs themselves are the ones keeping the terms of their
deals secret, it is [sic] raises the question of whether they have
something to hide.
Bartees Cox Jr., Public Knowledge Raises Concerns over Netflix/Comcast Agreement, PUB.
KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 23, 2014), https://www.publicknowledge.org/press-release/publicknowledge-raises-concerns-over-netflixcomca [http://perma.cc/K2R6-XLNF].
Alexis Ohanian, startup investor and co-founder of Reddit, lashed out
at U.S. broadband policy on Thursday, calling on the FCC to
reclassify internet broadband as “the utility we all know it to be.”
Ohanian aimed special vitriol at Comcast, affecting a mafia-style voice
to accuse the cable giant of “legal extortion” for fiddling with Netflix
speeds until the video site paid it to restore proper service.
Jeff John Roberts, Comcast “Extortion” Shows the Need to Treat Broadband as a Utility,
Reddit’s Ohanian Said, GIGAOM (Oct. 16, 2014, 8:31 AM), https://gigaom.com/
2014/10/16/comcast-extortion-shows-the-need-to-treat-broadband-as-a-utility-redditsohanian-said/ [http://perma.cc/9CJZ-5AXA].
68
See, e.g., Tim Wu, Comcast Versus the Open Internet, NEW YORKER (Feb. 24, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/elements/2014/02/comcast-versus-the-freeinternet.html [http://perma.cc/U86G-MXZJ]; see also ISP Speed Index, NETFLIX,
http://ispspeedindex.netflix.com/country/us (on the ISP Comparison Chart, from field
for Oct. 2013 and to field for Feb. 2014) [http://perma.cc/6TFA-WXXB] (last visited
Oct. 1, 2015) (providing Netflix subscribers with a graphical measure of how their ISP
compares with other carriers in terms of measured bit transmission speed).
69
See, e.g., Susan Crawford, Introducing the Comcast Tax, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Feb. 24,
2014, 3:24 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-02-24/introducing-thecomcast-tax [http://perma.cc/EFM3-YERA].
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subscribers would not experience degraded service,70 in light of the
real possibility that Netflix traffic could trigger congestion.71
The migration from peer to transit, or paid peering partner,
represents one of many adjustments in interconnection compensation arrangements triggered by changes in traffic flows.72 Heretofore, commercially driven negotiations have managed the transition
without resulting in many service disruptions. However, it appears
increasingly likely that interconnection negotiations will become
more contentious and protracted,73 particularly when retail ISPs
demand compensation from sources of high volume, bandwidth
intensive video content with which the ISPs do not interconnect
directly. As the Internet becomes a more common medium for the
70

See, e.g., Rayburn, supra note 51.
Netflix traffic constitutes as much as thirty-four percent of the total volume carried
by retail ISPs during peak hours. See Drew Fitzgerald, Netflix’s Share of Internet Traffic
Grows, WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2014, 10:48 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304908304579561802483718502 [http://perma.cc/P4RS-SHGX].
72
For background on peering, transit, and new interconnection arrangements, see
DRPEERING INT’L, http://drpeering.net/index.php [http://perma.cc/RFS7-JQBE] (last
visited Oct. 4, 2015); Ana-Maria Kovacs, Internet Peering and Transit, TECH. POL’Y INST.,
10–11 (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.techpolicyinstitute.org/files/amkinternetpeering
andtransit.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZD4C-RQ8C]; Dennis Weller & Bill Woodcock, Internet
Traffic Exchange: Market Developments and Policy Challenges, OECD DIGITAL ECON.
PAPERS, No. 207 (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/
internet-traffic-exchange_5k918gpt130q-en [http://perma.cc/KEV2-CJE8].
73
By regulating the terms upon which content providers use their
networks to reach consumers, broadband providers could manipulate
the flow of information in society. For example, Comcast could
conceivably block consumer
access to
websites
like
www.comcastsucks.org that criticize the company. Perhaps more
realistically, Comcast could block or degrade content and applications
like Netflix that compete against its other revenue-generating
services. Unlike America Online and other first-generation dial-up
Internet access providers, most broadband providers do not specialize
in providing Internet access alone. Rather, the largest broadband
providers are cable and telephone companies, which have incentives
to prevent customers from using their broadband connections in ways
that threaten their other revenue streams. For example, consumer
groups have expressed concerns that broadband Internet providers
that also offer on-demand movie rentals via cable might discriminate
against other services (such as Netflix or BitTorrent) that make
movies available over a broadband connection.
Daniel A. Lyons, Net Neutrality and Nondiscrimination Norms in Telecommunications, 54
ARIZ. L. REV. 1029, 1034 (2012) (citations omitted).
71
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delivery of video content, more compensation disputes will arise
that have possibly greater potential for consumer inconvenience
than carriage disputes between content providers and traditional
media outlets, such as satellite and cable television operators.
The FCC has delivered a mixed message to prospective disputants. It has created a regulatory dichotomy between retail ISPs,
now reclassified as telecommunications service providers, and upstream ventures, who retain the largely unregulated information
service classification if they are not corporate affiliates of the retail
ISP and do not offer public services. Additionally, the Commission
has opted not to apply the no blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization open Internet rules to interconnection between the upstream ISPs and retail ISPs.74 Notwithstanding the service classification dichotomy and the decision eschewing specific interconnection rules, the Commission reserves the option to intervene, on a
case-by-case basis, in the likely event that interconnection and
compensation disputes occur between upstream carriers and retail
ISPs.75
The Commission has created a “no-unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard”76 for evaluating both voluntary and
74

[T]his Order does not apply the open Internet rules to
interconnection. . . . While we have more than a decade’s worth of
experience with last-mile practices, we lack a similar depth of
background in the Internet traffic exchange context. Thus, we find
that the best approach is to watch, learn, and act as required, but not
intervene now, especially not with prescriptive rules.
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, paras. 30–31.
75
[C]ommercial arrangements for the exchange of traffic with a
broadband Internet access provider are within the scope of Title II,
and the Commission will be available to hear disputes raised under
sections 201 and 202 on a case-by-case basis: an appropriate vehicle
for enforcement where disputes are primarily over commercial terms
and that involve some very large corporations, including companies
like transit providers and Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), that
act on behalf of smaller edge providers.
Id. para. 29.
76
Under the no-unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard:
[T]he Commission can prohibit practices that unreasonably interfere
with the ability of consumers or edge providers to select, access, and
use broadband Internet access service to reach one another, thus
causing harm to the open Internet. This no-unreasonable
interference/disadvantage standard will operate on a case-by-case
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disputed terms and conditions under which retail ISPs and upstream carriers cooperate in the routing of broadband traffic. However, the FCC explicitly states that upstream ISPs and CDNs can
prioritize traffic77 even though the Commission explicitly prohibits
this option for retail ISPs. The FCC also exempts interconnection
between CDNs and retail ISPs from the no-unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard of evaluation.78
The FCC wisely defers to commercial incentives to achieve
beneficial outcomes, but stands ready to intervene when disputes
arise, or if a negotiated arrangement violates the Commission’s
somewhat ambiguous sense of what constitutes an anticompetitive
practice that harms consumers. The Commission attempts to reserve ample flexibility to act and it may have expertly calibrated the
scope of its possible intervention. On the other hand, it may come
across as an understatement to note that the FCC has generated
uncertainty over what commercially negotiated terms and conditions could trigger its intervention.
II. EXPEDITING DELIVERY OF “MISSION CRITICAL,”
“MUST SEE” VIDEO BITS
As the Internet becomes an increasingly important medium for
the delivery of video, the volume of traffic downloaded increases
and carriers must expand network capacity to handle the growth.
The prospect for disputes over compensation increase when downstream retail ISPs must regularly upgrade capacity, but believe they
are inadequately compensated by the ventures that have stimulated
greater download demand by “binge viewing” broadband subscribers. While retail ISPs receive compensation from both subscribers
basis and is designed to evaluate other current or future broadband
Internet access provider policies or practices—not covered by the
bright-line rules—and prohibit those that harm the open Internet.
Id. para. 108.
77
“We also clarify that the ban on paid prioritization does not restrict the ability of a
broadband provider and CDN to interconnect.” Id. para. 128.
78
“Thus, we conclude that, at this time, application of the no-unreasonable
interference/disadvantage standard and the prohibitions on blocking, throttling, and paid
prioritization to the Internet traffic exchange arrangements is not warranted.” Id. para.
195.
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and upstream ISPs, they have not achieved the same remarkable
commercial success as other ventures like Google and Netflix
which use their networks to deliver content to consumers. Accordingly, disputes have arisen and may increase in number when retail ISPs and upstream content sources disagree on the value of the
delivery service performed.
As the diversity, value, and volume of downloaded content increases, retail ISPs incur higher costs in delivering the content, and
accordingly seek ways to secure higher payments.79 For retail subscribers downloading much more content, ISPs can tier service and
charge higher rates based on the volume of content downloaded in
a month, rather than offer a single, “all you can eat” (“AYCE”)
unmetered rate.80
Rather than consider high volume consumers as pesky “bandwidth hogs,” retail ISPs have begun to consider them as favored
customers in light of the greater revenue and profit, which is generated by the higher tiered and more expensive services that offer
faster bit transmission rates and a higher monthly download allotment. The retail broadband access subscription increases in value
when consumers can substitute on demand video access in lieu of
“appointment television”81 access to content that is prescribed by
content creators or distributors at a specific time and available only
on a single broadcast, satellite, or cable channel. With successful
migration from unmetered, AYCE service for retail subscribers to a
tiered and metered system, retail ISPs now have turned their atten-

79
For example, in 2015 two major broadband providers, Comcast and Time Warner,
raised their cable modem rental rate by twenty-five and thirty-three percent respectively
to $120 and $96 per year. See Jose Pagliery, Comcast and Time Warner Cable Hike Modem
Fees as Much as 33%. Time to Buy Your Own, CNNMONEY (Jan. 5, 2015, 2:59 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/01/02/technology/comcast-time-warner-cable-modem/
[http://perma.cc/B8BZ-ULQW].
80
See Daniel A. Lyons, Internet Policy’s Next Frontier: Usage-Based Broadband Pricing,
66 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 3–4 (2013).
81
“Consumers are changing their viewing habits in favor of ‘TV Everywhere.’ They
no longer make ‘appointments’ to sit down and view content, and are no longer limited by
TV programming schedules. They want content whenever and wherever they are.” John
Clancy, Why the Future of TV Is All About Personalization, MASHABLE (Aug. 25, 2011),
http://mashable.com/2011/08/25/tv-mobile-personalization/ [http://perma.cc/W8C4X9X2].
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tion upstream to CDNs and content sources, such as Netflix, for
higher payments.82
III.

THE WAY FORWARD

Current and likely future Internet interconnection disputes
raise many of the same issues as the retransmission consent negotiations between television broadcasters and multichannel video programming distributors, such as cable and satellite television operators.83 Consumers are denied access to desirable video content as a
result of blackouts when incumbent media ventures fail to reach
closure by a contractual deadline, and through network congestion
when retail ISPs will not improve QOS without receiving additional
compensation.
Consumers have the right to expect that their significant
monthly broadband subscription payments entitle them to reliable
and high quality service that is not contingent on whether the retail
ISP succeeds in its demands for surcharges from specific carriers
and content sources. Without a regulatory safeguard, retail ISPs
can punish holdouts by inconveniencing their consumers with degraded service. Most consumers may not know how vulnerable
their Internet access is to service interruptions, whether caused by
real or artificial congestion. When an upstream carrier or content
source refuses to pay a surcharge by generating artificial congestion, the possibility exists that a retail ISP can retaliate.84 IPTV
viewers have a low pain threshold for degraded service, but they
have limited recourse in terms of shifting carriers, or demanding a
speedy resolution to a squabble between their ISP and an upstream
CDN or content source like Netflix.85
82

“Today, much Web content is not delivered to the ultimate recipient directly from
the Web server belonging to the original creator, but via a content delivery network
(CDN)—a collection of servers that cache the content and deliver it on demand.” David
D. Clark & Marjory S. Blumenthal, The End-To-End Argument and Application Design: The
Role of Trust, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 357, 364–65 (2011).
83
See Rob Frieden, The Costs and Benefits of Regulatory Intervention in Internet Disputes:
Lessons from Broadcast Signal Retransmission Consent Negotiations, 37 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 1, 8–9 (2015).
84
See id. at 15.
85
[T]he Commission found that most residential customers have only
one or two options for wireline broadband Internet access service,
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Commercial negotiations, unfettered by regulatory agency
oversight, constitute the preferred arrangement for parties to anticipate and resolve disputes. However, the likelihood of protracted
negotiations and outages that are harmful to consumers appears
increasingly likely, particularly now that substitutes for the traditional dichotomy of peering or transit have arisen. Consumers, upstream ISPs, and content sources need a complaint resolution forum that can reach timely and fair resolution of predictable disputes.
Retail ISPs have a right to recoup higher costs, including the
network upgrades made necessary by increased downloading of
bandwidth intensive video content. The problem lies in how retail
ISPs lawfully can recover such costs. The FCC concluded that it
needed to impose a near absolute bar on paid prioritization, because some retail ISPs might nudge or force upstream ISPs, CDNs,
and content sources to pay surcharges for “fast lane” access to
consumers.86 The Commission appears to discount the possibility
that retail ISPs might offer QOS enhancements that benefit consumers without harming competition. Retail ISPs ought to have the
option of offering reasonable types of price and QOS discrimination, based on actual differences in the cost of service and proof
that the arrangement will not harm consumers by degrading service
unless surcharge payments are received.
Put another way, not all forms of price discrimination and traffic prioritization evidence price gouging and unfair leveraging of
access to bottleneck facilities. For example, Comcast’s paid peering arrangement with Netflix provided permissible preferential
access by providing high level access to Comcast’s nationwide
network of peering points, normally made available to other major
carriers.87 Netflix secured enhanced QOS by paying Comcast in its
increasing the risk of market power, and found the future of mobile
Internet access service as a competing substitute remained unclear.
Moreover, the Commission emphasized that customers may incur
significant costs in switching from one provider to another, thus
creating “terminating monopolies” for content providers needing
high-speed broadband service to reach end users.
Id. at 20 n.78 (quoting 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 24, para. 42).
86
See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, para. 18.
87
See Frieden, supra note 83, at 8 n.27.
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capacity as an upstream ISP or CDN.88 The FCC has not implied
that such paid peering violates the 2015 Open Internet Order, even
though the very same type arrangement would constitute impermissible paid prioritization had Comcast offered such QOS enhancement for last mile delivery of the same content.
By reclassifying Internet access as a telecommunications service, the FCC wants clear statutory authority to prevent unreasonable discrimination. The Commission considers upstream paid prioritization from retail ISPs as reasonable QOS differentiation,
while downstream paid prioritization would constitute unlawful
discrimination.
A regulatory agency can change its statutory interpretations
and the regulatory classifications it has made in implementing statutorily imposed duties. For example, the FCC changed the regulatory classification of Digital Subscriber Line service from a telecommunications service to an information service.89 When making
a reclassification that triggers less or no regulation, the Commission receives ample support from stakeholders that benefit from
lowered or eliminated regulatory costs.
A reclassification from reduced or nonexistent regulation to
one that imposes new regulatory oversight will generate substantial
opposition, legal challenges, and high political costs for the FCC.90
In both types of reclassifications, the FCC must provide evidence,
ideally supported with empirical data, to support conclusions that
88

See id. at 24.
See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireline Facilities et al., Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC
Rcd. 14853, para. 5 (2005).
90
[C]able is willing to embrace the core principles of network neutrality
with the caveat that it will fight hard—very hard—against any pursuit
of rules that attempt to change the definition of broadband from an
information service, as it is today, to a common carrier service. If rule
makers try to regulate broadband services as common carrier services
under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, “that’s World
War III,” [National Telecommunications and Cable Association
CEO Michael] Powell said.
Jeff Baumgartner, Powell On NCTA’s 2014 Priorities: “Broadband, Broadband and
Broadband,” MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Oct. 22, 2013, 4:31 PM),
http://www.multichannel.com/news/content/powell-ncta-s-2014-priorities-broadbandbroadband-and-broadband/357180 [http://perma.cc/2WFD-E6QG].
89
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changed circumstances favor new or different regulatory requirements. Armed with the lawful authority to select from a larger set
of oversight tools, the FCC must closely calibrate the application of
new regulatory burdens so that only necessary marketcountervailing rules apply.
Additionally, the FCC should recognize that having Title II
regulatory authority does not empower it to prevent any and all
forms of discriminatory practices. Title II regulated common carriers can offer services, on different terms and conditions, provided
that any “similarly situated”91 consumer can qualify to become a
subscriber. This means that even regulated telecommunications
service providers can engage in certain types of price and QOS differentiation. Arguably a “better than best efforts” offering, promising higher QOS and faster delivery speeds, does not constitute
“unreasonable” discrimination, the only type of discrimination
Title II prohibits.
Unfortunately, the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order does not
provide sufficient clarity about what types of QOS enhancements
lawfully can be made available to content providers and on behalf of
consumers. The Commission states that a retail ISP cannot offer
paid prioritization that would create a premium fast lane for content delivery in exchange for “payment (monetary or otherwise) to
manage its network in a way that benefits particular content, applications, services, or devices.”92 However, carriers upstream from a
retail ISP, including major ISPs providing very high capacity
“backbone service” and CDNs, can offer such QOS enhancement
based on the rationale that these ventures do not provide access to
91

[T]he [Communications] Act defines the terms “common carrier”
and “carrier” to include “any person engaged as a common carrier
for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or
radio.” . . . Various regulatory obligations and entitlements set forth
in the Act—including a prohibition on unjust or unreasonable
discrimination among similarly situated customers and the
requirement that all charges, practices, classifications, and regulations
applied to common carrier service be “just and reasonable”—attach
only to entities meeting this definition.
In re IP-Enabled Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd. 4863, para. 24
(2004).
92
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, para. 18.
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and from the entire Internet cloud.93 Retail ISPs can seek a waiver
of the prohibition on paid prioritization, but the 2015 Open Internet Order explicitly imposes a “high bar”94 narrowing this option
to exceptional cases:
In support of any waiver request, the applicant
therefore must make two related showings. First,
the applicant must demonstrate that the practice
will have some significant public interest benefit,
such as providing evidence that the practice furthers
competition, innovation, consumer demand, or investment. Second, the applicant must demonstrate
that the practice does not harm the nature of the
open Internet, including, but not limited to, providing evidence that the practice:
• does not materially degrade or threaten to materially degrade the broadband Internet access
service of the general public;
• does not hinder consumer choice;
• does not impair competition, innovation, consumer demand, or investment; and
• does not impede any forms of expressions, types
of service, or points of view.95
It appears that an individual content provider or distributor,
such as Netflix, can lawfully secure a “better than best efforts”
93

Broadband Internet access service does not include virtual private
network (VPN) services, content delivery networks (CDNs), hosting
or data storage services, or Internet backbone services. The
Commission has historically distinguished these services from “mass
market” services and, as explained in the 2014 Open Internet NPRM,
they “do not provide the capability to transmit data to and receive
data from all or substantially all Internet endpoints.”
Id. para. 340.
The FCC opted not to apply any of the open Internet rules to these carriers: “[W]e
exclude this portion of broadband Internet access service—interconnection with a
broadband Internet access service provider’s network—from application of our open
Internet rules. We note that this exclusion also extends to interconnection with CDNs.”
Id. para. 193. Likewise, the “ban on paid prioritization does not restrict the ability of a
broadband provider and CDN to interconnect.” Id. para. 128.
94
Id. para. 132.
95
Id. para. 131.
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routing arrangement through paid peering, a type of paid prioritization.96 The Commission reports that such payments do achieve
higher QOS, but notes the controversy when such payments occur
in light of the possibility that a retail ISP could impose a surcharge
to abate traffic congestion it artificially created.97 The FCC will rely
on its complaint resolution process to sort out paid peering arrangements, but apparently, the FCC will not risk an after the fact
forensic investigation into whether retail ISP paid prioritization
arrangements can enhance consumer welfare without market distortion.
The FCC readily acknowledges that “[c]ontent providers have
come to rely on the services of commercial and private CDNs,
which cache content close to end users, providing increased QOS
and avoiding transit costs.”98 The Commission bars active participation by retail ISPs, either in coordination with an upstream carrier or unilaterally, based on the enhanced risk of harm to competition and consumers. This risk surely exists, but on the other side of
the ledger, consumers can benefit from many types of network
management functions that enhance QOS.
The FCC should have considered instances where retail ISP
network management providing better than best efforts routing
could facilitate the delivery of “must see” video without forcing
consumers and other carriers to migrate to this more expensive option. The Commission should not have imposed a near total ban on
96

Backbone ISPs can barter reciprocal carriage agreements without the transfer of
money. See id. paras. 197–201. Content providers and distributors can secure similar
carriage if they offer compensation for “paid peering.”
97
Some edge and transit providers assert that large broadband Internet
access service providers are creating artificial congestion by refusing
to upgrade interconnection capacity at their network entrance points
for settlement-free peers or CDNs, thus forcing edge providers and
CDNs to agree to paid peering arrangements. These parties suggest
that paid arrangements resulting from artificially congested
interconnection ports at the broadband Internet access service
provider network edge could create the same consumer harms as paid
arrangements in the last-mile, and lead to paid prioritization, fast
lanes, degradation of consumer connections, and ultimately, stifling
of innovation by edge providers.
Id. para. 200.
98
Id. para. 197.
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paid prioritization by retail ISPs. Rather than assign waiver seekers
a near impossible burden of proving that a paid prioritization arrangement could never harm anything, the Commission could have
afforded more flexibility, subject to a combination of transparency,
reporting, and complaint resolution safeguards to ensure that any
retail ISP’s QOS enhancement does not harm competitors and
consumers. The FCC has lawful authority to require carrier disclosure of specialized network arrangements and pricing options as
part of the Commission’s authority to require transparency into the
way ISPs do business.99
Likewise, the FCC can use its conventional dispute resolution
process in response to complaints submitted to it. Nothing prevents the FCC from investigating and remedying instances of unfair competition and trade practices that harm consumers and frustrate the Commission’s ability to achieve the goals articulated in
section 706 of the Communications Act, as amended, which affords ample latitude in identifying and resolving impediments to
widespread and affordable broadband access.100
For example, the FCC has clear statutory authority under section 706 to require ISPs to satisfy transparency requirements.
These transparency requirements include requiring ISPs to dis99

While reversing the FCC’s nondiscrimination rules as impermissible common
carrier regulation, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the FCC’s transparency
requirements. See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The FCC’s
existing transparency requirements state:
A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access
service shall publicly disclose accurate information regarding the
network management practices, performance, and commercial terms
of its broadband Internet access services sufficient for consumers to
make informed choices regarding use of such services and for
content, application, service, and device providers to develop,
market, and maintain Internet offerings.
47 C.F.R. § 8.3 (2015). The 2015 Open Internet Order requires additional disclosure by
broadband Internet access providers, including information on subscription fees, data
caps and allowances, network performance and network practices, including specific
disclosures related to congestion management, application-specific behavior, device
attachment rules, and security.
100
“The record amassed by the Commission contains many similar examples, and
Verizon has given us no basis for questioning the Commission’s determination that the
preservation of Internet openness is integral to achieving the statutory objectives set forth
in section 706.” Verizon, 740 F.3d at 645.
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close network management practices, performance characteristics,
and the terms and conditions of their broadband services, including
special arrangements negotiated with one carrier or customer, an
example of which is the paid peering agreement between Comcast
and Netflix.101
A reactive dispute resolution process should abate concerns
that the FCC has unlimited and intrusive power to regulate the Internet and the commercial terms and conditions of interconnection
and compensation. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals made it
clear that while the FCC cannot impose common carrier duties,102
it does have lawful authority to promote access to the Internet and
to remove impediments that frustrate achievement of this goal. To
identify the permissible scope of FCC compelled duties, the court
devoted considerable attention to a cable television case
precedent.103 The court concluded that the FCC can impose obligations to accommodate the needs of a select group of worthy stakeholders, such as broadcasters, but in the interest of openness and
nondiscrimination the FCC cannot impose requirements to accommodate a broader, undifferentiated group.104 Additionally, the
101

Comcast, the country’s largest cable and broadband provider, and
Netflix, the giant television and movie streaming service, announced
an agreement Sunday in which Netflix will pay Comcast for faster and
more reliable access to Comcast’s subscribers. The deal is a milestone
in the history of the Internet, where content providers like Netflix
generally have not had to pay for access to the customers of a
broadband provider.
Edward Wyatt & Noam Cohen, Comcast and Netflix Reach Deal on Service, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/24/business/media/comcast-andnetflix-reach-a-streaming-agreement.html [http://perma.cc/EW3U-6X72].
102
“We think it obvious that the Commission would violate the Communications Act
were it to regulate broadband providers as common carriers.” Verizon, 740 F.3d at 650.
103
The court cited United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968)
(affirming FCC jurisdiction to regulate cable television and to impose rules restricting
what signal it can retransmit) and United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I),
406 U.S. 649 (1972) (affirming FCC rules requiring certain cable companies to create
their own programming and maintain facilities for local production). See also Turner
Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (holding that must-carry obligations satisfy
intermediate scrutiny of rule impacting cable operator’s First Amendment speech rights);
Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (affirming the duty of cable
operators to carry significantly viewed local broadcast television signals).
104
The Midwest Video II cable operators’ primary “customers” were
their subscribers, who paid to have programming delivered to them in
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FCC must first defer to commercial negotiations between broadcasters and cable operators.
The D.C. Circuit also identified a previous instance where the
FCC overstepped its statutory authority in the area of compulsory
carriage. In FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II),105 the
court rejected the FCC mandated access—not by a small group like
local broadcasters, but by a far larger group of public access channel lessees—as too much like common carriage.106 The court rejected the FCC rules because they usurped the right of cable operators to make their own decision on how to load their inventory of
channel capacity.107
Retail ISPs have a similar right to determine how to load their
bandwidth and what price to charge, subject to a regulatory dispute
resolution process that assesses whether an ISP practice would
have a harmful effect on consumer access to the Internet cloud.
Section 706 provides the basis for the FCC to examine whether or
not ISPs have used resource allocation decisions to promote public
access to widespread and affordable broadband service.
Unfortunately, the FCC has opted to reclassify broadband Internet access as common carriage, rather than devise remedies that
require ISPs, as private carriers, to operate with greater transparency, to disclose service terms and conditions, and to negotiate in
good faith. While reclassification offers the opportunity for more
their homes. There, as here, the Commission’s regulations required
the regulated entities to carry the content of third parties to these
customers—content the entities otherwise could have blocked at
their discretion. Moreover, much like the rules at issue here, the
Midwest Video II regulations compelled the operators to hold open
certain channels for use at no cost—thus permitting specified
programmers to “hire” the cable operators’ services for free. Given
that the cable operators in Midwest Video II were carriers with respect
to these third-party programmers, we see no basis for concluding that
broadband providers are not similarly carriers with respect to thirdparty edge providers.
Verizon, 740 F.3d at 654.
105
440 U.S. 689 (1979).
106
See id. at 708.
107
“The access rules plainly impose common-carrier obligations on cable operators.
Under the rules, cable systems are required to hold out dedicated channels on a firstcome, nondiscriminatory basis. Operators are prohibited from determining or influencing
the content of access programming.” Id. at 701–02 (citations omitted).
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muscular and clear-cut regulatory oversight, it will reenergize ISPs
to litigate whether the FCC has engaged in rational decision making based on a complete evidentiary record. Such litigation will extend the period of regulatory uncertainty.
The FCC has asserted its legal right to reclassify services in
light of changed circumstances. However, it could have fine-tuned
and recalibrated its regulatory inventory over private carriers without broadly expanding its wingspan with the promise of forbearance and limited appetite for more extensive oversight. As well, the
Commission could have prevented possibly harmful regulatory uncertainty by establishing a simple and clear rule that ISPs can offer
QOS enhancements that help expedite the delivery of IPTV without degrading their conventional, best efforts traffic routing.

